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CAMPBELL AT 21/SONY AT 31 
 Jessica Litman* 
Abstract: When copyright lawyers gather to discuss fair use, the most common refrain is its 
alarming expansion. Their distress about fair use’s enlarged footprint seems completely untethered 
from any appreciation of the remarkable increase in exclusive copyright rights. In the nearly forty 
years since Congress enacted the 1976 copyright act, the rights of copyright owners have expanded 
markedly. Copyright owners’ demands for further expansion continue unabated. Meanwhile, they 
raise strident objections to proposals to add new privileges and exceptions to the statute to shelter 
non-infringing uses that might be implicated by their expanded rights. Copyright owners have used 
the resulting uncertainty over the scope of liability for new uses to litigate some new businesses into 
bankruptcy before their legality could be determined. These developments push fair use to shelter 
new uses and users. When lawyers for copyright owners complain that fair use has stretched beyond 
their expectations, they fail to acknowledge their own responsibility for its growth. This Article 
takes up these questions with particular attention to the thirty-one-year-old decision in Sony v. 
Universal Studios, and Congress’s assumptions about individual and contributory liability for 
personal copying before and after the Sony case. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The occasion for this symposium is that Campbell v. Acuff-Rose 
Music, Inc.1 had its twenty-first birthday earlier this year, and has 
therefore achieved its majority. We’ve been invited to examine 
Campbell’s “profound influence on fair use.”2 When the Court handed 
down the Campbell decision twenty-one years ago, the opinion garnered 
                                                      
* John F. Nickoll Professor of Law and Professor of Information, University of Michigan. Jon 
Weinberg’s comments on earlier drafts greatly improved this Article. 
1. 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
2. Symposia, WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW, http://www.law.uw.edu/wlr/symposia (last visited May 
10, 2015). 
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generally positive reviews.3 More recently, the decision, or its 
application by lower courts, has inspired significant criticism. The most 
common complaint is that Campbell’s instruction to focus on the 
transformativeness of defendant’s use has given lower courts license to 
find a use fair whenever they are so inclined.4 
When copyright lawyers gather to discuss fair use these days, the 
most common refrain is its alarming expansion.5 This distress about fair 
use’s enlarged footprint seems completely untethered from any 
appreciation of the remarkable increase in exclusive copyright rights. It’s 
uncontroversial that the scope of U.S. copyright has expanded in the past 
fifty years.6 It covers a broader array of copyrightable subject matter.7 It 
lasts longer.8 It grants owners additional rights.9 Court decisions have 
                                                      
3. See, e.g., Pierre N. Leval, Campbell v. Acuff-Rose: Justice Souter’s Rescue of Fair Use, 13 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 19 (1994); The Supreme Court, 1993 Term: Leading Cases, 108 HARV. 
L. REV. 139, 331–41 (1994). 
4. See, e.g., Matthew D. Bunker & Clay Calvert, The Jurisprudence of Transformation: 
Intellectual Incoherence and Doctrinal Murkiness Twenty Years After Campbell v. Acuff-Rose 
Music, 12 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 92 (2014); William Henslee, You Can’t Always Get What You 
Want, But If You Try Sometimes You Can Steal It and Call It Fair Use: A Proposal to Abolish the 
Fair Use Defense for Music, 58 CATH. U. L. REV. 663 (2009); Edward E. Weiman, Transforming 
Use: The Google Books Cases Have Created a New Area of Controversy Regarding the 
Transformative Use Defense to Copyright Infringement, L.A. LAW., June 2014, at 16–20. 
5. See, e.g., LIBRARY OF CONG., ORPHAN WORKS AND MASS DIGITIZATION ROUNDTABLES 39–
40 (2014) (remarks of June Besek), available at http://copyright.gov/orphan/transcript/ 
0310LOC.pdf; The Scope of Fair Use: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Prop., 
& the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 13–22 (2014) [hereinafter Scope of 
Fair Use Hearing] (testimony of June Besek, Columbia Law School); id. at 118–22 (prepared 
statement of Victor Perlman, American Society of Media Photographers); id. at 127, 130–33 
(statement submitted by the Copyright Alliance); Terry Hart, Fox News v. TVEyes: Fair Use 
Transformed, COPYHYPE (Sept. 16, 2014), http://www.copyhype.com/2014/09/fox-news-v-tveyes-
fair-use-transformed/; The Copyright Soc’y of the U.S.A., N.Y. Chapter, Content Aggregation: Fair 
Use or a Use Too Far?, PUNKCAST.COM (Oct. 24, 2013), http://punkcast.com/2534/2534/ 
2534_csusa_content_aggregation.mp4; The Copyright Soc’y of the U.S.A., N.Y. Chapter, If I Ran 
the Zoo: Probing the Contours of “The Next Great Copyright Act” (Mar. 26, 2014), 
http://media.csusa.org/chapters_new_york_video_15.html; see also Jane C. Ginsburg, Letter from 
the US: Exclusive Rights, Exceptions, and Uncertain Compliance with International Norms – Part 
II (fair use), REVUE INTERNATIONALE DU DROIT D’AUTEUR (RIDA) (forthcoming Jan. 2015) 
(claiming that recent fair use decisions violate international norms); Paul Goldstein, Fair Use in 
Context, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 433, 438 (2008) (claiming that the fair use analyses in the Sony 
Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984), Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling 
Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605 (2d Cir. 2006), and Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 
1146 (9th Cir. 2007) cases violate the Berne Convention’s minimum standards).  
6. See, e.g., Neil Weinstock Netanel, COPYRIGHT’S PARADOX 54–80 (2008). 
7. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012), with Act of March 4, 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, § 5, 35 
Stat. 1075, 1076, and Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 102(a), 90 Stat. 2541, 2544–45. 
8. Compare 17 U.S.C. §§ 302, 303, 304, with Act of March 4, 1909, §§ 23, 24, 35 Stat. at 1080–
81, and Copyright Act of 1976, §§ 302, 303, 304, 90 Stat. at 2572–76. 
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expanded the scope of traditional copyright rights.10 Congress has 
greatly enhanced the remedies for infringement.11 Individuals and 
organizations supporting strong copyright laws applaud these 
expansions.12 These same interests express surprise and dismay that, 
over the past fifty years, the fair use privilege has come to shelter a 
broader range of uses.13 
I have no reason to doubt the sincerity of those expressions of dismay. 
The idea, though, that copyright owners’ rights could be greatly inflated 
without inspiring a comparable expansion in fair use seems delusive. If 
many, many more uses are arguably prima facie infringing now than 
before, it follows that fair use will need to stretch to permit more of 
them. None of the voices expressing the hope that fair use could be 
confined or returned to its mid-twentieth century boundaries seem to 
endorse a proposal to cut back copyright rights to their mid-twentieth 
                                                      
9. Compare 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 106A, 1006, 1201, 1202, with Act of March 4, 1909, § 1, 35 Stat. 
at 1075 and Copyright Act of 1976, § 106, 90 Stat. at 2546. 
10. See, e.g., Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 800–05 (6th Cir. 2005); 
Hotaling v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 118 F.3d 199, 201 (4th Cir. 1997); MAI 
Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518–20 (9th Cir. 1993); see generally Jessica 
Litman, Billowing White Goo, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 587 (2008). 
11. Compare 17 USC §§ 502–505, with Act of March 4, 1909, § 25, 35 Stat. at 1081–82, and 
Copyright Act of 1976, §§ 502–505, 90 Stat. at 2541–86. 
12. See, e.g., ALLAN ADLER, ASS’N OF AM. PUBLISHERS, INC. RE: REQUEST FOR COMMENT ON 
GREEN PAPER, COPYRIGHT POLICY, CREATIVITY, AND INNOVATION IN THE DIGITAL ECONOMY 
(Nov. 13, 2013), available at http://www.publishers.org/_attachments/docs/copyright_policy/ 
aapgreenpaperc111313.pdf; AM. SOC’Y OF COMPOSERS, AUTHORS & PUBLISHERS, REQUEST FOR 
COMMENTS ON DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE GREEN PAPER, COPYRIGHT POLICY, CREATIVITY, AND 
INNOVATION IN THE DIGITAL ECONOMY (Nov. 15, 2013), available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ 
files/ntia/ascap_comments.pdf; MICHAEL O’LEARY, MOTION PICTURE ASS’N OF AM., IN THE 
MATTER OF REQUEST FOR COMMENTS ON DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE GREEN PAPER, COPYRIGHT 
POLICY, CREATIVITY, AND INNOVATION IN THE DIGITAL ECONOMY (Nov. 13, 2013), available at 
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/motion_picture_association_of_ 
america_comments.pdf; Jane C. Ginsburg, The Pros and Cons of Strengthening Intellectual 
Property Protection: Technological Protection Measures and Section 1201 of the United States 
Copyright Act, 16 INFO. & COMM. TECH. L. 191 (2007). 
13. See, e.g., Scope of Fair Use Hearing, supra note 5, at 13–14 (testimony of June Besek, 
Columbia Law School); id. at 104, 109–11 (Association of American Publishers statement 
submitted for the hearing record); Copyright Issues in Education and for the Visually Impaired: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Prop., & the Internet of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 113th Cong. 13–14 (2014) [hereinafter Copyright Issues in Education and for the 
Visually Impaired] (statement of Allan Robert Adler, General Counsel, Association of American 
Publishers); Hart, supra note 5; Raymond Nimmer, “Transformative Fair Use” Compared to 
“Transformative Purpose Infringement”, Some Cases Get this Totally Wrong Including in Google 
Books, CONTEMP. INTELL. PROP., LICENSING & INFO. L. BLOG (Mar. 22, 2014), 
http://www.ipinfoblog.com/archives/389731-print.html; see also Ginsburg, supra note 5, at 22 
(“The U.S. fair use doctrine is seeming rather cavernous of late.”). 
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century limits.14 They have been steadfast in insisting that it would be 
dangerous to allow Congress to consider balancing expanded copyright 
with appropriately expanded express limitations and exceptions.15 They 
urge, nonetheless, that fair use must be narrowly contained.16 
If Campbell is twenty-one years old, that means that another Supreme 
Court fair use case, Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios,17 had 
its thirty-first birthday in January. Some copyright lawyers with long 
memories identify Sony as the Supreme Court case in which fair use 
started to go wrong.18 
                                                      
14. See, e.g., Scope of Fair Use Hearing, supra note 5, at 127, 129 (statement submitted by the 
Copyright Alliance). 
15. See, e.g., First Sale Under Title 17: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual 
Prop., & the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 108 (2014) [hereinafter 2014 
First Sale Under Title 17 Hearing] (testimony of Emery Simon, Counselor, BSA, The Software 
Alliance) (arguing that expanding first sale doctrine “would upturn a cornerstone of our economy, 
our ability to contract and our ability to rely on contracts”); Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
Section 104 Report: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts & Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 18 (2001) [hereinafter 2001 Section 104 Report Hearing] (statement 
of Carey Ramos, National Music Publishers Association) (claiming the Register’s recommendation 
to enact an exemption for buffer copies would adversely affect music sales); id. at 25 (statement of 
Cary Sherman, Senior Executive Vice President and General Counsel, Recording Industry 
Association of America, Inc.) (claiming that expanding first sale doctrine “would undermine the 
fundamental objectives of the Copyright Act”); id. at 46 (statement of Emery Simon, Counsel, 
Business Software Alliance) (arguing that “temporary copy exceptions . . . would create 
uncertainty” and suppress the growth of e-commerce); id. at 76 (statement of Marvin Berenson, 
Senior Vice President and General Counsel, Broadcast Music Inc.) (arguing that the Register’s 
recommended exemptions “would adversely affect the rights of songwriters” and characterizing her 
analysis as “flawed, outside the scope of the inquiry, and not supported by the record”); see also 
sources cited supra note 11. 
16. See, e.g., Copyright Issues in Education and for the Visually Impaired, supra note 13, at 13–
14 (statement of Allen Robert Adler for the Association of American Publishers); Zehra Abdi, 
Morris v. Guetta: Are Appropriation Artists Getting a Free Pass by the Second Circuit?, COWAN, 
DEBAETS, ABRAHAMS & SHEPPARD LLP LEGAL BLOG (May 28, 2013), http://cdas.com/morris-v-
guetta-are-appropriation-artists-getting-a-free-pass-by-the-second-circuit-2/ (“The Second Circuit’s 
new, looser standard for determining whether a work is transformative is a shift from its usual 
conservatism and serves as an invitation for infringement.”); Hart, supra note 5 (“What was once a 
bounded exception allowing reasonable use of copyrighted works when necessary for specific 
purposes has become a broad and sweeping mechanism that allows courts to seemingly ignore 
copyright at their own discretion.”); Nimmer, supra note 13 (“Cases where courts protect copying 
verbatim of all of copyrighted works as fair use because the copies are then used for different 
purposes than the copyright owner has previously used its work . . . . stretch the boundaries of fair 
use and ‘transformative’ ‘use’ beyond any reasonable breaking point.”); Barry Sookman, The 
Google Book Project: Is It Fair Use?, BARRYSOOKMAN.COM (Jan. 5, 2014), 
http://www.barrysookman.com/2014/01/05/the-google-book-project-is-it-fair-use/. 
17. 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
18. See, e.g., Henslee, supra note 4, at 680–81; Christopher Alan Hower, Reviving Fair Use: Why 
Sony’s Expansion of Fair Use Sparked the File-Sharing Craze, 7 CHI.-KENT. J. INTELL. PROP. L. 
75, 81–86 (2007); David R. Johnstone, Debunking Fair Use Rights and Copyduty Under U.S. 
Copyright Law, 52 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 345, 382–83 (2005). 
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In the 1976 Copyright Act, Congress replaced a scheme of bounded, 
defined copyright rights specified for each copyright subject-matter 
category with a broad statement of generally applicable copyright 
exclusive rights offset by a list of detailed exceptions.19 It also codified 
the doctrine of fair use. The Sony case, filed within weeks of the 1976 
Act’s enactment, was the first case to pose the question whether fair use 
was an appropriate shelter for conduct that Congress had failed to 
consider.20 Answering that question in favor of either party would 
require some revision in traditional understandings of fair use. 
In Sony, the Court reshaped fair use in order to limit contributory 
liability and shelter personal uses.21 That fair use formulation didn’t 
work out so well for traditional beneficiaries of the fair use privilege, 
most of whom made uses that were both public and commercial.22 In 
Campbell, the Court revised fair use again for the benefit of traditional 
fair users.23 That might have left personal users out in the rain. But in the 
ten years that the Sony test had held sway, readers, consumers, and 
businesses that made products to augment consumers’ enjoyment of 
copyright works had adjusted their expectations and habits to a world in 
which fair use shielded personal uses from copyright liability. If 
copyright owners hoped that Campbell’s recalibration of the fair use 
analysis would simply remove noncommercial and personal copies from 
fair use’s shelter, they were disappointed. But that hope was never 
politically reasonable. 
The Campbell decision, and its application by lower courts, makes 
more sense when one appreciates its predecessor, Sony v. Universal. The 
Sony decision, in turn, makes more sense when one recognizes the 
challenges posed by problems that Congress failed to address when it 
enacted the 1976 Act. 
I. A SURPRISING LAWSUIT 
The 1909 Copyright Act adopted the strategy of furnishing detailed 
                                                      
19. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-533, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. 
§§ 101–1205 (2012)). 
20. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F. Supp. 429, 432 (C.D. Cal. 1979), 
rev’d, 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), rev’d, 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
21. Sony, 464 U.S. at 449–55; see, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, The Generativity of Sony v. 
Universal: The Intellectual Property Legacy of Justice Stevens, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1831, 1845–
50, 1862–65 (2006). 
22. See Pierre N. Leval, Nimmer Lecture: Fair Use Rescued, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1449, 1455–56, 
1463–64 (1997). 
23. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
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specifications of the copyright rights available to owners of each type of 
work.24 At the turn of the twentieth century, the specification of rights 
may well have seemed comprehensive, but as the century wore on, it 
turned out to be seriously incomplete.25 The 1976 Act, therefore, took 
the opposite strategy of articulating the rights in very broad terms, and 
then loading up the statute with exceptions, limitations, and privileges 
for the uses that Congress deemed to be non-infringing.26 Congress paid 
heed, though, only to uses and users brought to its attention by entities 
involved in hammering out copyright revision, and did not address a 
host of uses and users not presented to it.27 
Once the 1976 Act took effect, users and uses that Congress had not 
considered inevitably arose in lawsuits. Courts were left with the 
unappealing choice of assimilating those uses to activities that Congress 
had considered;28 finding implicit privileges, exceptions, and limitations 
in the statute;29 or redesigning a statutory exception, limitation, or 
privilege to fit the new situation.30 The Sony litigation posed two large 
problems to which Congress had given little thought: the liability of 
consumers for making copies for personal use, and the liability of device 
manufacturers for facilitating infringing consumer uses. 
Sony was not the first case seeking to hold the manufacturer of a 
device liable because the device facilitated infringements,31 but it was 
                                                      
24. See Act of March 4, 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, § 1, 35 Stat. 1075, 1075. This specification 
looks a little crazy to modern eyes. Literary works, for example, received an exclusive translation 
right but dramatic works did not; dramatic works, but not literary works, got an exclusive right to 
record the works and exhibit or perform the recordings. Musical works’ public performance right 
was limited to public performance for profit; dramatic works’ public performance right had no for-
profit limitation. As originally enacted, the 1909 Act gave novels and other literary works no public 
performance right whatsoever. Id. 
25. See, e.g., Jessica Litman, Silent Similarity, 14 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. L. 11 (2015). 
26. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106–122 (2012); see generally JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 54–
59 (2006). 
27. I told this story at some length in Jessica Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological 
Change, 68 OR. L. REV. 275 (1989). 
28. See, e.g., Am. Broad. Co. v. Aereo, Inc., __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2505–08 (2014).  
29. See, e.g., Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., 180 F.3d 1072 (9th 
Cir. 1999); Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Prof’l Real Estate Investors, Inc., 866 F.2d 278 (9th 
Cir. 1989); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. 
Cal. 1995).  
30. See, e.g., In re Cellco P’ship, 663 F. Supp. 2d 363, 375–77 (2009) (holding the public 
performance of ringtones to be privileged by 17 U.S.C. § 110(4) (2005)). 
31. In Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55 (1911), the publisher of a novel sued a film studio 
for producing an unauthorized film adaptation of the novel. Id. at 60. Under the copyright law in 
effect at the time, a film version was not a “copy” of the novel on which it was based. The Supreme 
Court held that when the movie theatres that bought the film projected its images on a screen, those 
projections dramatized the novel. Id. at 61–62. By making and advertising the film, the studio was 
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the first suit seeking to hold a manufacturer of a device liable for 
facilitating allegedly infringing behavior by millions of consumers in 
their homes.32 The case raised problems that Congress had not 
considered during the twenty-year process that led to the revision. 
Members of Congress appear to have assumed that individuals were not 
liable for making personal copies of copyrighted works, and they simply 
hadn’t imagined a suit against a device maker seeking to recover for the 
actions of millions of individuals in their homes.33 Indeed, although 
Congress paid significant attention to newfangled copying technologies, 
and had asked a blue ribbon commission to consider the issues posed by 
new methods of reproduction, nobody appears to have suggested to 
congressional committees or to the members of the Commission on New 
Technological Uses (CONTU) that the manufacturers of copying devices 
might be liable for infringing uses of their machines. 
II. WHAT WE LEARN FROM THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
The disruptive technologies of the 1960s were photocopying and 
audiotape recording. Computers were on the horizon, but the threats they 
posed were still hypothetical. When educators asked for exemptions for 
educational photocopying and computer use, copyright owners urged 
Congress to leave those exemptions out of the statute and instead refer 
the question whether they were necessary to a blue ribbon commission.34 
During the hearings on successive drafts of the legislation that became 
the 1976 Act, witnesses and members of Congress discussed 
photocopying and tape recording extensively.35 Everyone acknowledged 
                                                      
liable not as a direct infringer, but as a contributory infringer. Id. at 62–63. Early suits against radio 
broadcasters over the broadcast of unlicensed public performances for the purpose of promoting the 
sales of radios cast the manufacturer-broadcaster as a contributory rather than a direct infringer. See, 
e.g., Jerome H. Remick & Co. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 16 F.2d 829, 829 (S.D.N.Y. 1926). 
32. See Leval, supra note 22, at 1457. 
33. See infra notes 34–60 and accompanying text. 
34. E.g., Copyright Law Revision: Hearing on H.R. 4347, H.R. 5680, H.R. 6831, and H.R. 6835 
Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 1452-60 (1965) [hereinafter 
1965 House Hearings] (testimony of Bella Linden, American Textbook Publishers Institute). 
Congress did refer the photocopying problem to a commission, which it named the Commission on 
New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU). NAT’L COMM’N ON NEW 
TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, FINAL REPORT 1 (1978). CONTU labored 
mightily and came back with a report strongly implying that individual photocopying was fair use 
but photocopying by commercial photocopy services might not be. Id. at 48–50. 
35. See generally Prohibiting Piracy of Sound Recordings: Hearing on S. 646 and H.R. 6927 
Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong. (1971) [hereinafter 
Prohibiting Piracy of Sound Recordings Hearing]; Copyright Law Revision: Hearing on S. 597 
Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks & Copyrights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th 
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that consumers were already using photocopiers and tape recorders to 
make copies of copyrighted works for their own use, and that there was 
not and should not be a fear of consumer liability for making those 
copies.36 Most but not all of the witnesses said that an individual’s use of 
a photocopy machine in a library or workplace qualified as fair use.37 
There were outliers. One witness—Ralph Dwan, of the 3M Corporation 
(a major manufacturer of both audiotape and photocopy machines)—
asked Congress to enact a provision explicitly privileging the making of 
any personal or private copies so long as they were not offered for sale.38 
In response to Dwan’s proposal, a single witness—Irwin Karp for the 
Author’s League—insisted that even individual photocopying should be 
considered to be infringement: 
 If an individual or an institution borrowed a copy of a book 
from a library and ran off 100 copies on a Xerox machine, or 
any other method, 100 copies at one time, and sold them or gave 
them to me and to 99 other people, he would be guilty of 
infringement. If he ran off the hundred copies one at a time, as 
each of us ordered them, and gave them or sold them to us, it 
would still be an infringement. In either event a hundred copies 
would have been made and placed in the hands of a hundred 
people without the author’s consent, and without any payment to 
the author or publisher. 
  Now suppose that I and the 99 other persons each borrowed 
the same copy of the book from the same library and each of us 
made a copy for himself on a Xerox machine. The result is the 
same. One hundred copes [sic] have been made and placed in 
the hands of a hundred people without the author’s consent, and 
without any payment to the author or publisher. 
 Now I had not intended to belabor the Xerox machine; we 
don’t object to copying technology, we welcome it. It so 
                                                      
Cong. (1967) [hereinafter 1967 Senate Hearings]; 1965 House Hearings, supra note 34; Diane 
Leenheer Zimmerman, Modern Technology, Leaky Copyrights, and Claims of Harm: Insights from 
the Curious History of Photocopying, 61 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y OF THE U.S.A. 1, 19–27 (2013).  
36. See, e.g., Prohibiting Piracy of Sound Recordings Hearing, supra note 35, at 22–23 
(colloquy). 
37. See, e.g., Copyright Law Revision: Hearing on S. 1006 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, 
Trademarks and Copyrights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 180 (1965) (testimony of 
Mark Carroll, Chairman, Copyright Committee, Association of American University Presses); id. at 
187–88 (colloquy); 1965 House Hearings, supra note 34, at 119–21 (statement of Dan Lacy, 
Managing Director, American Book Publishers Council); id. at 367–71 (colloquy); id. at 1517–18 
(colloquy). 
38. 1965 House Hearings, supra note 34, at 1498–99 (statement of Ralph H. Dwan, Minnesota 
Mining & Manufacturing Co. (3M)). 
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happens that when someone makes a superior product they must 
suffer the penalty of being cited an example, and I am only 
using them as an example.39 
For the most part, though, lawyers representing copyright owners 
testified that their concern over photocopying technology was that it 
would be used for mass duplication, displacing the traditional publishing 
industry.40 Though consumers also made copies, copyright owners didn’t 
view that as a major concern.41 None of the lobbyists participating in 
copyright revision suggested that the makers of photocopying machines 
might be liable for unauthorized copying by their customers.42 Members 
of Congress didn’t seriously consider whether the new law should 
impose liability on consumers or manufacturers for photocopying 
because nobody asked them to do so. 
Similar evidence supports the inference that members of Congress 
believed that neither the 1909 Copyright Act nor the 1976 Act made it 
illegal for consumers to use a tape recorder to record music from records 
or radio broadcasts. The 1909 Act had protected “musical works” (i.e., 
the musical composition authored by a composer) but had not extended 
copyright protection to “sound recordings” (i.e., the recording of a 
performance of a composition, authored by performers and a record 
producer or sound engineer).43 Record labels first sought federal 
copyright protection for their recordings in response to radio 
broadcasters’ and jukebox operators’ commercial use of their records.44 
                                                      
39. Id. at 1756 (statement of Irwin Karp, Authors’ League of America, Inc.). 
40. See, e.g., id. at 1431 (testimony of Bella Linden, American Textbook Publishers Institute); id. 
at 1514 (prepared statement of Williams & Wilkins Co.). 
41. See, e.g., 1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 35, at 64–96 (testimony of Prof. Jesse W. 
Markham, Horace S. Manges, Lee C. Deighton, and Bella L. Linden for the American Textbook 
Publishers Institute and the American Book Publishers Council, Inc.); 1965 House Hearings, supra 
note 34, at 121 (testimony of Dan Lacy, Managing Director, American Book Publishers Council); 
id. at 1451–60 (testimony of Bella Linden, American Textbook Publishers Institute); id. at 1505–07 
(colloquy); id. at 1517–18 (colloquy); see also id. at 1650 (statement of Gerhard Van Arkel, General 
Counsel, International Typographical Union) (“There is all the difference in the world between a 
library photocopying an occasional page of a work for the use of a scholar, and the making of 
multiple copies of entire works by any of the photographic processes which may now substitute for 
printing, presswork and binding.”). 
42. One witness did suggest that the owner of a copying machine should be liable for its 
infringing use, but thought that manufacturers’ responsibility should be limited to an obligation to 
affix labels on their machines warning that the use of the machines was subject to federal currency 
and copyright laws. 1965 House Hearings, supra note 34, at 1516 (testimony of Lyle Lodwick, 
Williams & Wilkins Co.). 
43. See generally BARBARA A. RINGER, STUDY NO. 26: THE UNAUTHORIZED DUPLICATION OF 
SOUND RECORDINGS (1957). 
44. See, e.g., Milton Diamond & Jerome H. Adler, Proposed Copyright Revision and 
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Efforts to expand copyright to cover sound recordings in the 1920s, 
1930s, and 1940s foundered.45 In the 1950s, increasing concern over 
commercial record piracy made the problem more urgent.46 
As early as 1961, the Copyright Office recommended that the revision 
bill that became the 1976 Copyright Act confer copyright protection on 
sound recordings,47 and it included copyright for sound recordings in the 
earliest draft revision bill.48 In 1963, the Phillips Corporation introduced 
the 3.8 mm audio cassette tape and portable cassette tape player to the 
U.S. market. As a result, commercial record piracy became cheaper and 
easier.49 Meanwhile, the sale of inexpensive consumer cassette tape 
recorders allowed home taping of records and radio to explode.50 By 
1965, the House and Senate committees had settled on language giving 
sound recordings limited copyright protection,51 but the copyright 
                                                      
Phonograph Records, 11 AIR L. REV. 29, 45, 55–56 (1940). 
45. A 1957 Copyright Office Study described previously unsuccessful efforts to extend copyright 
to sound recordings going back as early as 1925. RINGER, supra note 43, at 21–37. The principal 
obstacles, as then-Assistant Register Barbara Ringer tells the story, were disputes between 
performers and record labels about which of them the law should deem the author and copyright 
owner, resistance by composers and music publishers, and objections from broadcasters, who feared 
that copyright in recordings would oblige them to pay record royalties as well as music royalties. Id.  
46. See, e.g., Sidney A. Diamond, Copyright Problems of the Phonograph Record Industry, 8 
BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y OF THE U.S.A. 337, 353 (1961); RINGER, supra note 43, at 47.  
47. REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG., REP. ON THE 
GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 17–18 (Comm. Print 1961). 
48. COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION PART 3: PRELIMINARY DRAFT FOR REVISED U.S. COPYRIGHT 
LAW AND COMMENTS AND DISCUSSION ON THE DRAFT 1 (Comm. Print 1964) [hereinafter CLR Part 
3]. The copyright for sound recordings was expressly limited by section 10 of the draft bill to a right 
to reproduce directly and distribute dubbed copies of the sound recording, excluding an imitation 
right and a public performance right. See id. at 7–8. This limitation survived in the version enacted 
in 1976. One of the political problems that doomed earlier efforts was a dispute over whether the 
author of a sound recording was the musician responsible for the performance or the record label 
that released it. The 1964 draft sought to evade that problem by failing to specify the answer. That 
disagreement remained a dozen years later, and the act accordingly incorporated the ambiguity. The 
dispute over authorship of sound recordings continues to plague the law today. See, e.g., 
Bucciarelli-Tieger v. Victory Records, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 2d 702 (N.D. Ill. 2007). 
49. See Prohibiting Piracy of Sound Recordings Hearing, supra note 35, at 4 (statement of Rep. 
Celler); id. at 10–12 (testimony of Barbara A. Ringer, Assistant Register of Copyrights). 
50. See id. at 120 (letter from David Abshire, Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations, 
U.S. Department of State); ADRIAN JOHNS, PIRACY: THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY WARS FROM 
GUTENBERG TO GATES 444–48 (2009). 
51. Sections 106 and 112 of H.R. 4347, 89 Cong. (as introduced by Rep. Emanuel Celler on Feb. 
4, 1965), like the 1964 draft bill, described supra note 48, would have given the owners of the 
copyright in sound recordings the exclusive right to duplicate or dub the actual sounds on the 
recording, and to distribute dubbed copies but no public performance right. Performers and 
musicians objected vehemently to the bill because it failed to give their interests sufficient 
protection. See 1965 House Hearings, supra note 34, at 1387–405 (1966) (the Performing 
Musicians’ Opposition to the 1965 Bill for General Copyright Revision). 
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revision bill had stalled in the Senate because the operators of 
Community Antenna Television (an early form of cable television) 
couldn’t reach agreement with motion picture producers and 
broadcasters.52 Record labels insisted that the piracy problem demanded 
immediate action.53 The Senate subcommittee made the decision to split 
off the sound recording copyright provisions into a discrete bill and 
enact it separately.54 Drafters took the substantive provisions of the 
copyright revision bill and retrofitted the language to match the language 
of the 1909 Act.55 
At the House hearings on the new, stand-alone sound recording 
copyright bill, House Judiciary Committee Chairman Emanuel Celler 
explained that the bill was designed to target record “piracy,” which he 
described as “the unauthorized commercial duplication and sale of a 
reproduction of a sound recording, often at a sharply cut price.”56 
Representative Edward Biester, Republican of Pennsylvania, asked 
whether his son’s use of a cassette recorder to record music off the radio 
would be prohibited by the bill. Assistant Register of Copyrights 
Barbara Ringer assured him that it would not.57 
The House Report on the bill repeated that understanding: 
In approving the creation of a limited copyright in sound 
recordings it is the intention of the Committee that this limited 
copyright not grant any broader rights than are accorded to other 
copyright proprietors under the existing title 17. Specifically, it 
is not the intention of the Committee to restrain the home 
recording, from broadcasts or from tapes or records, of recorded 
performances, where the home recording is for private use and 
with no purpose of reproducing or otherwise capitalizing 
commercially on it. This practice is common and unrestrained 
today, and the record producers and performers would be in no 
different position from that of the owners of copyright in 
                                                      
52. See Copyright Law Revision—CATV: Hearing on S. 1006 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, 
Trademarks, & Copyrights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. (1966); Jessica Litman, 
Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 857, 874–75 (1987). 
53. See Prohibiting Piracy of Sound Recordings Hearings, supra note 35, at 38–41 (statement of 
Stanley M. Gortikov, Director, Recording Industry Association of America); id. at 41–42 (statement 
of Jack Grossman, President, National Association of Record Merchandisers, Inc.). 
54. See S. REP. NO. 92-72, at 3–6 (1971). 
55. Prohibiting Piracy of Sound Recordings Hearing, supra note 35, at 13 (testimony of Barbara 
A. Ringer, Assistant Register of Copyrights). 
56. Id. at 4 (statement of Rep. Celler). 
57. Id. at 22–23 (colloquy). 
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recorded musical compositions over the past 20 years.58 
That formulation indicates that members of the House committee 
recognized that neither the owners of musical composition copyrights 
nor the owners of the new sound recording copyrights had rights under 
the statute that extended to noncommercial home copying. Chairman 
Kastenmeier made the point again on the floor of the House of 
Representatives just before the House voted in favor of the Bill. 
 Mr. KAZEN. Am I correct in assuming that the bill protects 
copyrighted material that is duplicated for commercial purposes 
only? 
 Mr. KASTENMEIER. Yes. 
 Mr. KAZEN. In other words, if your child were to record off 
of a program which comes through the air on the radio or 
television, and then used it for her own personal pleasure, for 
listening pleasure, this use would not be included under the 
penalties of this bill? 
 Mr. KASTENMEIER. This is not included in the bill. I am 
glad the gentleman raises the point. 
 On page 7 of the report, under “Home Recordings,” Members 
will note that under the bill the same practice which prevails 
today is called for; namely, this is considered both presently and 
under the proposed law to be fair use. The child does not do this 
for commercial purposes. This is made clear in the report.59 
Thus, as of 1971, when the language, structure, and scope of the bill 
that became the 1976 Copyright Act had been settled except for details, 
members of Congress appear to have believed that that language didn’t 
and wouldn’t reach noncommercial consumer copying. As with 
photocopiers, there was no suggestion that the manufacturers of audio 
recorders or blank audio media might bear legal responsibility for 
unlicensed copies. 
Let me stop to emphasize the limits of my point. I am not arguing 
here that the language of the 1976 Copyright Act should be read to 
incorporate an unstated exclusion for consumer liability. I am making 
only the modest observation that the evidence we have indicates that, 
when Congress enacted the 1976 Act, senators and representatives 
believed that neither consumer photocopying nor consumer taping of 
music would count as copyright infringement under the language of the 
Act. Reasonable people may have heated arguments over the extent to 
                                                      
58. H.R. REP. NO. 92-487, at 7 (1971). 
59. 117 CONG. REC. 34, 748–49 (1971). 
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which Congress’s understanding of what it was doing ought to constrain 
courts’ interpretation of the language Congress enacted. For my 
purposes, it’s sufficient to show that Congress didn’t anticipate that the 
1976 Act would subject consumers to liability for copyright 
infringement, so it didn’t give any attention to the circumstances under 
which consumers should receive express exemptions or privileges. 
Because Congress appears to have assumed that individuals would 
not be liable for copyright infringement for unauthorized consumer 
copying, it didn’t take the opportunity at any time during the twenty-year 
revision process to consider what exceptions, limitations, and privileges 
would be appropriate for unlicensed personal uses.60 Because of that 
assumption, moreover, it never considered the possibility that 
widespread unlicensed personal uses would be deemed infringing in the 
aggregate, or that the makers of devices or services would be accused of 
infringement for making those uses possible. It had no opportunity to 
design exemptions or limitations for those cases, if it thought it 
appropriate to do so, nor to fashion an appropriate range of remedies for 
contributory infringement liability predicated on the sale of 
infringement-enabling devices and services to the general public. 
III. SONY AND ITS AFTERMATH 
On November 11, 1976, three weeks after Congress enacted the 1976 
Copyright Act, Universal Studios filed a copyright infringement suit 
against William Griffiths. Universal didn’t expect to recover any money 
from Griffiths. In fact, he was a client of Universal’s law firm who 
happened to own a Sony Betamax videotape recorder. The firm secured 
his permission to be sued before naming him in its lawsuit against 
Sony.61 Universal felt that Sony’s manufacture and sale of a videotape 
recorder infringed its copyrights in the programs that consumers taped.62 
Because Sony itself did not reproduce, adapt, distribute, perform, or 
                                                      
60. A handful of privileges that courts have applied to personal uses were in fact drafted for the 
benefit of institutions. The § 110(4) privilege that the court in In re Cellco P’ship, 663 F. Supp. 2d 
363, 375–77 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), construed to permit owners of cellphones to publicly perform music 
when their cellphones rang in public places, for example, was designed to permit school assemblies. 
See COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION PART 6, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF 
COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 39 (Comm. Print 1965). 
61. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F. Supp. 429, 437 (C.D. Cal. 1979), 
rev’d, 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), rev’d, 464 U.S. 417 (1984); see JAMES LARDNER, FAST 
FORWARD: A MACHINE AND THE COMMOTION IT CAUSED 17 (2002). Lardner’s book, adapted and 
expanded from a series of articles in The New Yorker magazine, is an authoritative and highly 
readable account of the facts underlying the Sony Betamax lawsuit. 
62. See LARDNER, supra note 61, at 5–9, 13. 
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display any of Universal’s movies, Sony was not itself doing anything 
the copyright statute prohibited. Universal’s legal theory, though, was 
that Sony was deliberately enabling consumers to make unlawful copies 
of television programs, and should therefore be held liable as a 
contributory infringer.63 In order to hold Sony liable for consumers’ 
copyright infringement, Universal’s lawyers believed they should make 
one of those consumers a defendant in the suit.64 
Many copyright owners understandably believe that they should be 
able to control who profits from works in which they own the 
copyrights.65 Sony was making a significant amount of money selling 
devices designed to copy copyrighted television programs, and the fact 
that Sony wasn’t itself doing any of the copying didn’t seem to 
Universal as if it should be determinative. And while suits against 
consumers before this lawsuit were almost unheard of, copyright owner 
efforts to stop other businesses from profiting from copyrighted works 
were not. 
I like to call this problem the trumpet problem.66 Trumpets, here, are a 
synecdoche for the businesses that make instruments, devices, and 
services designed for the enjoyment of copyrighted works. This category 
comprises trumpets, pianos, violins, radios, cameras, televisions, tape 
recorders, film projectors, computers, DVD players, ebook readers, 
smart phones, tablets, iPods, music cyberlockers, cloud storage, and 
user-generated video platforms. The people who make trumpets are in 
the business of making money because of works written by others. 
Indeed, their business models often depend on the indirect commercial 
exploitation of other people’s creativity. In general, trumpet makers 
profit commercially by taking advantage of readers’, listeners’, and 
players’ willingness to spend money to enhance their enjoyment of 
works (or advertisers’ willingness to spend money to reach individuals 
who enjoy copyrighted works). Because the copyright statute defines the 
scope of copyright owners’ rights with reference to reproducing, 
adapting, and publicly distributing, performing, and displaying, 
unlicensed profiting from copyrighted works, without more, is not 
infringement. 
In suing Sony for making and selling Betamax recorders, then, 
Universal was claiming that consumers who used the Betamax to record 
                                                      
63. See Sony, 480 F. Supp. at 441–42. 
64. See LARDNER, supra note 61, at 17–18. 
65. See, e.g., David Carr, Spreading Disruption, Shaking up Cable TV, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 
2013, at B1, B5. 
66. See, e.g., Jessica Litman, Real Copyright Reform, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1, 21 (2010). 
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and then watch television programs were making infringing copies of the 
programs, and that Sony should be liable as a contributory infringer for 
giving consumers the tool necessary to commit the infringement.67 The 
aspect of the suit that attracted the most public attention was the claim 
that William Griffiths might be liable for using a recording device in his 
home to allow him to watch television programs.68 The claim that 
proved more troubling to the judges who had to decide the case was the 
idea that an appropriate response to unlicensed copying was to impose 
infringement liability on the makers and sellers of copying machines.69 
Neither Congress nor the CONTU Commission had even broached that 
as a possibility. What made the claim at least colorable was Congress’s 
casting exclusive copyright rights in very broad terms and then 
subjecting the rights to specific exceptions. Sony’s sale of video 
recorders was simply a particularly surprising example of a situation in 
which Congress had failed to imagine copyright infringement liability 
and therefore failed to include express limitations or define boundaries 
to divide infringing from non-infringing actions. The general problem 
would keep coming up. 
The trial judge reviewed the copyright statute’s legislative history and 
concluded that neither the 1909 Copyright Act nor the 1976 Act gave 
copyright owners control over an individual’s home copying of 
television broadcasts for personal use.70 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit 
reversed. The panel read the language of the statute to prohibit any and 
all reproductions that were not explicitly exempted.71 Home videotaping 
went unmentioned by both the 1909 and 1976 Copyright Acts, so 
making personal videotapes necessarily infringed the studios’ copyright. 
Since the primary purpose of a Betamax machine was to allow 
consumers to make these infringing copies, Sony, its advertising agency, 
and the stores that sold Betamax recorders should all be liable for 
contributory infringement.72 
Sony appealed, and the Supreme Court agreed to hear the case. After 
                                                      
67. See Sony, 480 F. Supp. at 441–42. 
68. See, e.g., Robert Lindsey, Monumental Legal Battle Shaping Up in Bid to Bar Color TV 
Recorders, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1977, at D1, D8; Philip Shenon, Copyright v. ‘Reprography’ 
Revolution, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 1981, at E7.  
69. See Leval, supra note 22, at 1457; Jessica Litman, The Sony Paradox, 55 CASE W. RES. L. 
REV. 917, 945–46 (2005). 
70. Sony, 480 F. Supp. at 442–47. 
71. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963, 966 (9th Cir. 1981), rev’d, 
464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
72. Id. at 971–76. 
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oral argument, the majority of Justices were disposed to affirm the Ninth 
Circuit decision, at least in part.73 Justice Blackmun took on the 
assignment of drafting the opinion for the Court. His analysis began with 
the premise that the 1976 Act granted copyright owners a broad 
reproduction right. According to Congress’ plan, any unlicensed 
reproduction was infringing unless it came within a statutory exception. 
The statute did not include an express exemption for home video 
recording.74 Justice Blackmun concluded that Congress had proved it 
was able to draft explicit exemptions for the private uses when it 
included a privilege for libraries to make a single copy for a patron’s 
private study scholarship or research, and when it limited the 
performance right to public performances.75 Fair use should not apply; it 
was a narrow privilege intended to permit “productive uses[s], resulting 
in some added benefit to the public beyond that produced by the first 
author’s work.”76 
Justice Stevens disagreed. He insisted that the legislative history of 
the 1976 Copyright Act evidenced a widely shared understanding that it 
was not copyright infringement for individuals to make personal copies 
for their own use.77 A further difficulty with reading the statute to permit 
the imposition of contributory liability for the aggregate copying of 
millions of consumers was the fact that the remedy sections of the statute 
didn’t seem to contemplate it; indeed, they permitted copyright owners 
to seek statutory damages, even for innocent infringement, of a 
minimum of $200 for each and every work infringed. Those provisions 
                                                      
73. This account of the Supreme Court’s deliberations in the Sony case is drawn from the papers 
of Justices Blackmun, Marshall, and Brennan, and has been told in more detail in Jonathan Band & 
Andrew J. McLaughlin, The Marshall Papers: A Peek Behind the Scenes at the Making of Sony v. 
Universal, 17 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 427 (1994), and Litman, supra note 69. Justice Blackmun 
had reluctantly recused himself from an earlier copyright fair use case, Williams & Wilkins Co. v. 
United States, 420 U.S. 376 (1975), because of his nine years as resident counsel to the Mayo clinic. 
The Mayo Foundation was a defendant in the case. Blackmun’s personal notes indicate that, had he 
participated, Blackmun would have provided the fifth vote to reverse the Court of Claims, and hold 
the National Library of Medicine liable for photocopying articles from medical journals. 
74. First Draft Opinion of Justice Harry A. Blackmun at 8–9, Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal 
City Studios, Inc., No. 81-1687 (circulated June 13, 1983). 
75. Id. at 12–13. Furthermore, Blackmun wrote, Congress had proved it was able to draft 
exemptions for the reproduction of single copies when it included privileges for libraries and 
broadcasters to make no more than one copy in the statute. Id. at 9. Justice Blackmun also noted that 
the House and Senate Reports mentioned a handful of instances in which the making of a single 
copy would be fair use. Id.  
76. Id. at 22.  
77. Memorandum from Justice John Paul Stevens to the Conference (June 13, 1983); Letter from 
Justice John Paul Stevens to Justice Harry A. Blackmun (Jan. 24, 1983); see also Band & 
McLaughlin, supra note 73, at 433–34. 
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would subject both consumers and the manufacturers of copying 
equipment to “truly staggering liability.”78 
Justice Stevens circulated letters to the other Justices arguing the 
merits of his position. He sent around successive drafts of an alternative 
opinion.79 Justice Stevens would have recognized a categorical 
exemption for consumer home copying, but could not persuade a 
majority of his colleagues to agree. Instead, he articulated a standard for 
ascertaining whether William Griffiths’ copying (and the copying of 
four million Betamax owners like him) was a sufficient predicate for 
Sony’s liability. Stevens’ efforts peeled off Justices from Justice 
Blackmun’s majority until he had collected the five votes he needed.80 
Stevens’ opinion for the majority concluded that consumers’ copying of 
broadcast television was in many cases not copyright infringement 
because it was fair use. 
[Section 107] identifies various factors that enable a court to 
apply an “equitable rule of reason” analysis to particular claims 
of infringement. Although not conclusive, the first factor 
requires that “the commercial or nonprofit character of an 
activity” be weighed in any fair use decision. If the Betamax 
were used to make copies for a commercial or profitmaking 
purpose, such use would presumptively be unfair. The contrary 
presumption is appropriate here, however, because the District 
Court’s findings plainly establish that time-shifting for private 
home use must be characterized as a noncommercial, nonprofit 
activity. Moreover, when one considers the nature of a televised 
copyrighted audiovisual work, see 17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (1982 
ed.), and that time-shifting merely enables a viewer to see such a 
work which he had been invited to witness in its entirety free of 
charge, the fact that the entire work is reproduced, see § 107(3), 
does not have its ordinary effect of militating against a finding 
of fair use. 
 This is not, however, the end of the inquiry because Congress 
has also directed us to consider “the effect of the use upon the 
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.” § 107(4). 
The purpose of copyright is to create incentives for creative 
                                                      
78. Letter from Justice John Paul Stevens to Justice Harry A. Blackmun (Jan. 24, 1983). 
79. First Draft Memorandum of Justice John Paul Stevens, Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City 
Studios, Inc. (No. 81-1687) (circulated June 13, 1983); Second Draft Memorandum of Justice 
Stevens, Sony Corp. Of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc. (No. 81-1687) (circulated June 27, 
1983); Third Draft Memorandum of Justice Stevens, Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 
Inc. (No. 81-1687) (circulated June 28, 1983). 
80. See Litman, supra note 69, at 932–41. 
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effort. Even copying for noncommercial purposes may impair 
the copyright holder’s ability to obtain the rewards that 
Congress intended him to have. But a use that has no 
demonstrable effect upon the potential market for, or the value 
of, the copyrighted work need not be prohibited in order to 
protect the author’s incentive to create. The prohibition of such 
noncommercial uses would merely inhibit access to ideas 
without any countervailing benefit. 
 Thus, although every commercial use of copyrighted material 
is presumptively an unfair exploitation of the monopoly 
privilege that belongs to the owner of the copyright, 
noncommercial uses are a different matter. A challenge to a 
noncommercial use of a copyrighted work requires proof either 
that the particular use is harmful, or that if it should become 
widespread, it would adversely affect the potential market for 
the copyrighted work. Actual present harm need not be shown; 
such a requirement would leave the copyright holder with no 
defense against predictable damage. Nor is it necessary to show 
with certainty that future harm will result. What is necessary is a 
showing by a preponderance of the evidence that some 
meaningful likelihood of future harm exists. If the intended use 
is for commercial gain, that likelihood may be presumed. But if 
it is for a noncommercial purpose, the likelihood must be 
demonstrated. 
 In this case, respondents failed to carry their burden with 
regard to home time-shifting.81 
While Justice Stevens failed to persuade the majority of his 
colleagues that personal uses should be categorically exempt from 
copyright infringement liability, he did persuade them to adopt a 
standard under which personal uses were deemed noncommercial and 
presumptively fair. The standard would prove unworkable not because 
of that presumption, but because of the corollary that all commercial 
uses were presumptively unfair.82 
A year after releasing the Sony decision, in a case involving excerpts 
from former President Gerald Ford’s autobiography, the Court returned 
to the twin presumptions. The Nation had summarized and quoted 300 
                                                      
81. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 448–51 (1984). Justice 
Blackmun revised his draft majority opinion and released it as a dissent. He argued that fair use 
should be limited to productive reuses that merited a subsidy, and consumer copying for personal 
use was an ordinary rather than a productive use. But he had, at least temporarily, lost that argument 
with his colleagues. 
82. Leval, supra note 22, at 1455–56. 
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words from Ford’s forthcoming memoir, and the publisher had sued it 
for copyright infringement. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
thought the use should be deemed fair under § 107,83 but the Supreme 
Court relied on the Sony presumptions to reverse.84 Although The Nation 
magazine was marginal,85 it was formally a business, seeking to earn a 
profit. Its use of 300 words from the Ford memoir was therefore 
commercial, and thus presumptively unfair. “The fact that a publication 
was commercial as opposed to nonprofit is a separate factor that tends to 
weigh against a finding of fair use,” Justice O’Connor wrote, quoting 
Sony. “[Every] commercial use of copyrighted material is presumptively 
an unfair exploitation of the monopoly privilege that belongs to the 
owner of the copyright.”86 
The Harper & Row case highlighted a defect in Sony’s formulation of 
fair use. In Sony, the Court confronted a case predicated on consumers’ 
personal copying. The Supreme Court found that copying to be fair use 
by recognizing a presumption that noncommercial uses came within the 
shelter of § 107. But, that, in turn, suggested a related presumption that 
commercial uses were to be presumed unfair. As one would expect, the 
latter presumption worked very badly for traditional beneficiaries of fair 
use, many of whom used copyrighted works in connection with 
commercial activity. Biographers,87 parodists,88 and news organizations89 
suddenly found fair use unavailable. Meanwhile, though, the public had 
come to understand that noncommercial and personal uses were not 
infringing. Members of Congress appear to have shared that 
interpretation. 
While the Sony litigation was working its way through the courts, 
motion picture studios, device makers, and consumer and library groups 
                                                      
83. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 208 (2d Cir. 1983), rev’d, 
471 U.S. 539 (1985).  
84. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560–63 (1985). 
85. According to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, The Nation’s receipts from 
newsstand sales of the issue were $418. Harper & Row, 725 F.2d at 198. 
86. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 562; see also Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 237 (1990) (Since 
“[p]etitioners received $12 million from the re-release of the motion picture during the renewal 
term,” their use was commercial.). 
87. See, e.g., New Era Publ’ns Int’l v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576, 583–84 (2d Cir. 1989). 
88. See, e.g., Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992); Tin Pan Apple, Inc. v. Miller 
Brewing Co., 737 F. Supp. 826 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Original Appalachian Artworks v. Topps Chewing 
Gum, Inc., 642 F. Supp. 1031 (N.D. Ga. 1986). 
89. See Hi-Tech Video Prods., Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 804 F. Supp. 950 (W.D. Mich. 
1992). 
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sought clarifying copyright amendments from Congress.90 Between the 
1981 Ninth Circuit decision finding Sony liable, and the 1984 Supreme 
Court decision holding that home recording of broadcast television 
programming was fair use, Congress held seven hearings on the issue 
and considered nine different bills.91 Both motion picture industry-
backed bills92 and consumer- and device-maker-backed bills93 expressly 
absolved consumers of any liability for home recording of video 
programs. Movie industry bills, however, coupled the exemption with a 
mechanism for collecting royalties from device and media 
manufacturers.94 The industry assured Congress that it had no interest in 
pursuing individual homeowners who taped television shows.95 Even the 
Motion Picture Association of America lobbyist Jack Valenti, who 
famously testified that “the VCR is to the American film producer and 
the American public as the Boston strangler is to the woman home 
alone,” conceded a few minutes later that he owned and used a video 
tape recorder and wasn’t at all worried about being sued.96 
The assumption that consumers would not be not liable for making 
unlicensed copies for personal use persisted in Congress during the 
decade following the Sony decision and was an important predicate for 
                                                      
90. See Video and Audio Home Taping: Hearing on S. 31 and S. 175 Before the Subcomm. on 
Patents, Copyrights & Trademarks of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 1 (1983) 
[hereinafter 1983 Home Taping Hearing]; Home Recording of Copyrighted Works: Hearing on H.R. 
4783, H.R. 4794, H.R. 4808, H.R. 5250, H.R. 5488, and H.R. 5705 Before the Subcomm. on Courts 
of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. (1982) [hereinafter 1982 Home Recording Hearing].  
91. See 1983 Home Taping Hearing, supra note 90; Copyright Office/Copyright Royalty 
Tribunal: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, & the Administration of Justice 
of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. (1983) [hereinafter 1983 Royalty Tribunal Hearing]; 
Oversight of the Copyright Office and the Copyright Royalty Tribunal: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights, & Trademarks of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 
(1983) [hereinafter 1983 Oversight Hearing]; Copyright and Technological Change: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, & the Administration of Justice of the H. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 98th Cong. (1983) [hereinafter 1983 Technological Change Hearing]; 1982 Home 
Recording Hearing, supra note 90; Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders): Hearing 
on S. 1758 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 549 (1982) [hereinafter 1982 
Copyright Infringements Hearing]. 
92. See, e.g., S. 31, 98th Cong. (1983); H.R. 5705, 97th Cong. (1982). 
93. See, e.g., S. 175, 98th Cong. (1983); S. 1758, 97th Cong. (1981); H.R. 4783, 97th Cong. 
(1981). 
94. See, e.g., S. 31, 98th Cong. (1983). 
95. See, e.g., 1983 Home Taping Hearing, supra note 90, at 276–77 (testimony of Jack Valenti, 
Motion Picture Association of America); 1982 Copyright Infringements Hearing, supra note 91, at 
459 (testimony of Jack Valenti, Motion Picture Association of America). 
96. See 1982 Home Recording Hearing, supra note 90, at 8, 10 (testimony of Jack Valenti, 
Motion Picture Association of America). 
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the 1992 Audio Home Recording Act.97 In the years following Sony, the 
recording industry lobbied Congress in pursuit of a rule limiting the 
importation and sale of digital audio recorders.98 Record labels argued 
that the Sony standard didn’t, or at least shouldn’t, make home audio 
recording lawful; the manufacturers of tape recorders insisted that their 
devices were staple articles of commerce under Sony, immune from 
liability so long as they were capable of substantial non-infringing 
uses.99 Eventually, record labels, composers, music publishers, 
musicians, and the makers of recording devices reached a compromise 
calling for the implementation of copy-control technology in digital 
recorders and the payment of a royalty on sales of recording machines 
and blank recording media, to be divided among record labels, 
performers, composers, and music publishers.100 
Crucially, though, in return for those provisions, members of 
Congress insisted on an explicit statement in the law that clarified 
consumers’ rights to make noncommercial copies of recorded music 
without fear of copyright liability.101 That concession was essential to 
gaining congressional support for the amendment. Owners of music and 
sound recording copyrights acceded to it because—at the time—it 
seemed cheap.102 Under the Sony formulation of fair use, noncommercial 
consumer copying was already presumptively fair.103 
                                                      
97. See H.R. REP. NO. 102-873 (1992); S. REP. NO. 102-294, at 30 (1991) (“The purpose of S. 
1623 is to ensure the right of consumers to make analog or digital audio recordings of copyrighted 
music for their private, noncommercial use.”).  
98. See generally Copyright Issues Posed by Digital Audio Tape: Joint Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights, & Trademarks of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary and the 
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, & the Administration of Justice of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 100th Cong. (1987) [hereinafter 1987 Digital Audio Hearing]; Home Audio Recording 
Act: Hearing on S. 1739 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. (1986) [hereinafter 1986 
Home Audio Hearing]. 
99. See 1986 Home Audio Hearing, supra note 98, at 90–91 (testimony of Stanley Gortikoff, 
Recording Industry Association of America); id. at 289–90, 298 (testimony of Charles Ferris, Audio 
Recording Rights Coalition). 
100. See Audio Home Recording Act of 1991: Hearing on H.R. 3204 Before the Subcomm. on 
Intellectual Property & Judicial Admin. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 1–2 (1993) 
[hereinafter 1991 Audio Recording Hearing] (remarks of Rep. Hughes); The Audio Home Recording 
Act of 1991: Hearing on S. 1623 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights & Trademarks of the 
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 109–11 (1992) (testimony of Jason Berman, Recording 
Industry Association of America). 
101. H.R. REP. NO. 102-873, pt. 1, at 24 (1992); see William F. Patry, Section 1008, PATRY 
COPYRIGHT BLOG (Aug. 17, 2005), http://williampatry.blogspot.com/2005/08/section-1008.html. 
102. See generally 1991 Audio Recording Hearing, supra note 100. 
103. See Jessica Litman, War Stories, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 337 (2002). The continuing 
vitality of the consumer noncommercial copying exemption, and its application to files copied using 
computers rather than dedicated audio recording devices, is disputed. See id. at 357–60. Compare 
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IV. FAIR USE AND CAMPBELL V. ACUFF-ROSE 
While consumers and businesses after Sony organized their activities 
and products around the assumption that noncommercial and personal 
consumer uses were generally non-infringing, writers, publishers, and 
performers faced an unanticipated risk of liability for customary uses. 
The presumptive unavailability of fair use for commercial purposes 
meant that uses long deemed to be fair use suddenly were fair no more. 
Some courts devised evasions to allow them to give the commercial 
nature of the use reduced weight,104 but other courts found the 
commercial purpose of purported fair users determinative.105 
In 1994, the Supreme Court repudiated the twin presumptions when it 
decided Campbell.106 It did not, however, repudiate either the result or 
the reasoning in Sony. Justice Souter’s opinion for the Court instead 
maintained that Sony had been misconstrued by lower courts. 
If, indeed, commerciality carried presumptive force against a 
finding of fairness, the presumption would swallow nearly all of 
the illustrative uses listed in the preamble paragraph of § 107, 
including news reporting, comment, criticism, teaching, 
scholarship, and research, since these activities “are generally 
conducted for profit in this country.” Harper & 
Row . . . (Brennan, J., dissenting). Congress could not have 
intended such a rule, which certainly is not inferable from the 
common-law cases, arising as they did from the world of letters 
in which Samuel Johnson could pronounce that “[n]o man but a 
blockhead ever wrote, except for money.” 3 Boswell’s Life of 
Johnson 19 (G. Hill ed. 1934).107 
The Sony opinion, he insisted, “called for no hard evidentiary 
                                                      
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.2d 1004, 1024 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Audio Home Recording 
Act does not cover the downloading of MP3 files to computer hard drives.”), with Recording Indus. 
Ass’n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., 180 F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Such copying is 
paradigmatic noncommercial personal use entirely consistent with the purposes of the Act.”). 
104. See, e.g., Sega Enters., Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992); Fisher v. Dees, 
794 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1986); Haberman v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 626 F. Supp. 201 (D. Mass. 
1986). 
105. See Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 972 F.2d 1429, 1436 (6th Cir. 1992), rev’d, 510 
U.S. 569 (1994); Hi-Tech Video Prods. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 804 F. Supp. 950, 955 (W.D. 
Mich. 1992); Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko’s Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1532 (S.D.N.Y. 
1991); Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 642 F. Supp. 1031 (N.D. 
Ga. 1986). 
106. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 583–85, 594. 
107. Id. at 584. 
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presumption.”108 A more important aspect of the first fair use factor, 
Justice Souter wrote, was the extent to which the use was 
“transformative.” That formulation was drawn from Judge Pierre Leval’s 
1990 Harvard Law Review commentary Toward a Fair Use Standard.109 
(Judge Leval later returned the favor, calling Justice Souter’s opinion in 
Campbell “the finest opinion ever written on the subject of fair use.”110) 
The Campbell analysis returned fair use part of the way back to the 
traditional, mid-twentieth century understanding of how fair use should 
work. But, of course, it couldn’t return it all the way. The problem posed 
by the Sony case remained unsolved. What should courts do about uses 
or infringement claims that Congress had paid no attention to, in 
particular personal uses? Campbell didn’t speak to it; it carefully 
preserved the result in Sony without giving lower courts much guidance 
on whether or when the Sony analysis remained viable. As the 1976 Act 
aged, that problem arose more and more often. Courts have struggled to 
figure out how fair use applies to new uses and new technologies.111 
Efforts to gain more clarity from Congress, meanwhile, have largely 
been stymied by legacy copyright owners’ insistence that Congress enact 
no new express exemptions and privileges. 
 
                                                      
108. Id. 
109. Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1990). 
110. See Leval, supra note 22, at 1464. Judge Leval also observed that he agreed that the Court 
had reached the right result in Sony: “Before leaving Sony, I wish to make clear that I do not suggest 
it was incorrectly decided. I am wholly in agreement that production of the VTR [(video tape 
recorder)] should not have been enjoined.” Id. at 1457. The Judge continued: 
If it were enjoined because of its capacity to make infringing copies, why not also enjoin the 
use of the camera, the audio-tape recorder, the photocopier, and the computer—perhaps even 
pen and paper, or the printing press. All can be used to make infringing copies. The copyright 
law could put us back in the middle ages. But the decision to deny relief was fully justified on 
other grounds without need to launch a fundamental reinterpretation of fair use. As for the 
question whether an infringement has occurred when a private person uses the VTR to time-
shift a program for a one-time noncommercial viewing, that question falls in the same category 
as the question whether infringement occurs when the waiters sing “Happy Birthday” at a 
patron’s table, or when someone makes a photocopy of a New Yorker cartoon to put up on the 
refrigerator. What category is that? Questions that never need to be answered. If it did need to 
be answered, I believe the answer would be provided by the doctrine of de minimis non curat 
lex—the law does not concern itself with trifles—a doctrine that is of great importance to a 
proper understanding of the law of copyright. 
Id. at 1457–58. 
111. See, e.g., In re Aimster, 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 
239 F.3d 2004 (9th Cir 2001); Sega Enters., Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992); 
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 321–25 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), aff’d sub 
nom. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001); Kelly v. Arriba Soft 
Corp., 77 F. Supp. 2d 1116 (C.D. Cal. 1999), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 
2003); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’ns Servs., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1378–82 
(N.D. Cal. 1995). 
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V. PERSONAL USES, CONTRIBUTORY LIABILITY, AND 
CONGRESS 
In the years since the enactment of the 1976 copyright revision, 
Congress has had many chances to revisit the question of consumer 
liability for personal uses. It has amended the copyright law more than 
fifty times, and held innumerable hearings on digital piracy, online 
infringement, and peer-to-peer file sharing.112 Yet, until the 2003 John 
Doe suits filed by record labels and motion picture producers, members 
of Congress appear not to have anticipated that consumers might be 
liable for making copies for personal uses. 
When courts in the 1990s read § 106 rights expansively to reach 
commercial activity that corresponded to common personal uses, 
members of Congress read those decisions to apply to exploitative and 
commercial acts without threatening consumers’ behavior.113 When the 
Ninth Circuit held that a computer repair firm’s turning on a computer 
infringed the § 106(1) reproduction right in the computer’s operating 
system software,114 Congress amended the law to permit computer 
maintenance and repair services to turn on their customers’ 
computers.115 It didn’t include a provision allowing consumers to turn on 
their own computers, because of members’ assumption that consumers’ 
computer use did not violate copyright owners’ rights under § 106(1).116 
When civil liberties groups lobbied for explicit consumer exemptions, 
senators and representatives voiced skepticism that courts would hold 
consumers liable for ordinary uses of copyrighted works.117 When 
                                                      
112. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR 92: COPYRIGHT LAW OF THE UNITED STATES AND 
RELATED LAWS CONTAINED IN TITLE 17 OF THE UNITED STATES CODE, at vi–xii (2011); see, e.g., 
Piracy of Intellectual Property on Peer-to-Peer Networks: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, 
the Internet, & Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2002) [hereinafter 
2002 Piracy Hearing]; Music on the Internet: Is There an Upside to Downloading?: Hearing Before 
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (2000) [hereinafter 2000 Music on the Internet 
Hearing]. 
113. See Jessica Litman, Lawful Personal Use, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1871, 1904–07 (2007).  
114. MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peake Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 517–18 (9th Cir. 1993); see also 
Joseph Liu, Owning Digital Copies: Copyright Law and the Incidents of Copy Ownership, 42 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 1245, 1255–78 (2001); Pamela Samuelson, The Copyright Grab, WIRED, Jan. 
1996, at 134. 
115. Computer Maintenance Competition Assurance Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860, 
2886 (1998).  
116. See 144 CONG. REC. S4888–89 (1998) (statement of Sen. Ashcroft); id. at 4892–92 (remarks 
of Sen. Grassley); 144 CONG. REC. H7092 (1998) (statement of Rep. Frank); 143 CONG. REC. E21 
(Jan. 1, 1997) (statement of Rep. Knollenberg); Litman, supra note 113, at 1905 n.190. 
117. See, e.g., Digital Media Consumers’ Rights Act of 2003: Hearing on H.R. 107 Before the 
Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, & Consumer Protection of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 
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Congress took up the question of contributory liability for infringing 
material posted publicly by subscribers, it enacted safe harbors for 
Internet service providers rather than oblige them to screen all files 
posted to the Internet for infringing content.118 Having enacted a 
provision to protect a particular class of services from liability for their 
subscribers’ acts, Congress raised the minimum and maximum statutory 
damages available for infringement.119 It did not otherwise revisit the 
question of remedies to devise a measure for damages appropriate for 
contributory infringers. 
Three years later, in a report mandated by the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act (DMCA), the Register of Copyrights proposed that 
Congress enact a narrow statutory privilege to make temporary digital 
copies incidental to an otherwise lawful use.120 Representatives of the 
                                                      
108th Cong. 46–47 (2004) (statement of Rep. Stearns); id. at 68–71 (colloquy); WIPO Copyright 
Treaties Implementation Act; and Online Copyright Liability Limitation Act: Hearing on H.R. 2281 
and H.R. 2180 Before the Subcomm. on Courts & Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1997).  
118. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, title II, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (Oct. 28, 
1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512); see also 144 CONG. REC. S4888 (May 14, 1998) (remarks of 
Sen. Ashcroft). Judge Edward Damich was a member of Senator Orrin Hatch’s staff while Congress 
was considering the DMCA. Judge Damich told me that he had suggested to copyright owners and 
Internet service providers that the statute should include language clarifying that individual 
consumers were not liable for viewing infringing files over the Internet from their homes. Lobbyists 
for copyright owners were unenthusiastic, and Internet service providers insisted that such language 
would not be necessary, so long as the providers would not be held liable for consumers’ 
infringement. See Litman, supra note 26, at 30–31, 34 n.12. 
119. The 1988 Berne Convention Implementation Act had amended § 504(c) by raising the 
minimum statutory damages award from $250 per work infringed to $500 per work infringed, and 
doubling the maximum awards from $10,000 per work for non-willful infringement and $50,000 per 
work infringed for willful infringement to $20,000 and $100,000 per work infringed. Berne 
Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853, 2860. In 1999, 
Congress increased the minimum and maximum statutory damage awards again, to $750, $30,000, 
and $150,000 per work infringed. Digital Theft Deterrence and Copyright Damages Improvement 
Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-160, 113 Stat. 1774, 1774. 
120. Section 104 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act had directed the Copyright Office to 
study the question (among others) and to submit a report to Congress within two years. In the 2001 
report, the Copyright Office noted sharp division between proponents of a broad privilege to make 
ephemeral RAM (random access memory) copies incidental to lawful use and opponents of any 
diminution in the scope of the reproduction right. Representatives of copyright owners had argued, 
the Copyright Office reported, that it was inappropriate to enact any exception for the benefit of any 
user interest that had not demonstrated concrete harm from the potentially overbroad application of 
section 106. Computer repair services had demonstrated harm and Congress had accordingly 
enacted a narrow exception. Since others had not yet been held liable for making RAM copies, any 
statutory privilege was premature. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, DMCA SECTION 104 REPORT 50–
58 (2001), available at http://www.copyright.gov/reports/studies/dmca/sec-104-report-vol-1.pdf 
[hereinafter DMCA SECTION 104 REPORT]. After examining testimony and written comments on 
both sides, the Copyright Office had concluded that the scope of the exclusive reproduction right 
was disputed: 
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entertainment and software industries protested. Rather than arguing that 
consumers who made such copies were or should be liable under current 
law, opponents of the legislation warned that even a narrow privilege 
might provide a loophole for future commercial piracy.121 As part of the 
same Report, the Register noted that the literal language of the copyright 
law appeared to prohibit the common and prudent practice of making 
archival or backup copies of computer files and other digital content.122 
Copyright owners, while acknowledging the mismatch between the 
statutory language and widespread behavior, opposed any amendment of 
the law to permit digital backups. They argued that since nobody had 
sued consumers over backing up their hard drives, proponents of an 
archival exception had failed to prove any harm from its absence.123 
Adding an express exception for computer or other digital backups, they 
insisted, would only encourage commercial software pirates to use the 
exception as a bad faith justification for infringement.124 The Register 
nonetheless recommended that Congress enact a modest change, either 
enacting a limited privilege for digital backups, or limiting the uses that 
could be made of backup files that were otherwise privileged under the 
fair use doctrine.125 The entertainment software trade association 
                                                      
Nonetheless, a general rule can be drawn from the language of the statute. In establishing the 
dividing line between those reproductions that are subject to the reproduction right and those 
that are not, we believe that Congress intended the copyright owner’s exclusive right to extend 
to all reproductions from which economic value can be derived. 
Id. at 111. RAM copies, the Office concluded, should generally be deemed to be fixed within the 
meaning of the statute and therefore potentially infringing. Id. at 112–23. There was, however, no 
evidence that anyone was bringing copyright infringement suits against consumers for such 
copying, and the Office had concluded that consumer RAM copies would generally be deemed non-
infringing because of fair use or implied license. Id. at 124–45. The Register nonetheless supported 
an amendment to clarify that no liability should attach to ephemeral copies that were incidental to 
lawful music transmissions. Id.  
121. Music industry representatives insisted that such an amendment would be inappropriate 
since no showing of harm had been made. Software publishers protested that recognizing any 
loopholes for any users would post grave piracy risks. See 2001 Section 104 Report Hearing, supra 
note 15, at 76–83 (statement of Marvin Berenson, Broadcast Music, Inc.); id. at 17–23 (statement of 
Carey Ramos, National Music Publishers Association); id. at 45–52 (statement of Emery Simon, 
Business Software Alliance). 
122. See DMCA SECTION 104 REPORT, supra note 120, at 150 (“Based on the evidence presented 
during the course of preparing this Report, there is a fundamental mismatch between accepted, 
prudent practice among most system administrators and other users, on one hand, and section 117 
on the other. As a consequence, few adhere to the letter of the law.”) 
123. Id. at 65, 151–52. 
124. Id. at 61–63, 152. 
125. The Copyright Office had concluded that, in the absence of an express archival exception, 
hard disk backups were probably fair use. Id. at 158–59. If they were fair use, though, backup 
copies would be deemed to have been “lawfully made,” and therefore potentially subject to the first 
sale doctrine, which permits the owners of lawfully made copies to resell them or give them away. 
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objected that the current statutory exception for back-up copies of 
computer programs was itself no longer necessary, since software was 
distributed on more durable media than it had been when Congress 
enacted the original archival exception, and that the provision was 
already being used as an excuse for ruinous piracy.126 Music copyright 
owners expressed alarm that the statutory privilege might be expanded to 
permit archival copies of music.127 No member of Congress introduced 
an amendment to implement the Register’s proposal. 
As recently as a decade ago, then, most members of Congress had no 
reason to believe that their constituents’ ordinary noncommercial 
copying, adaptation, distribution, performance, or display of material 
protected by copyright would subject them to copyright infringement 
suits. Although Congress had significantly expanded the scope of 
copyright rights, it had done so against a background understanding that 
the law did and should protect copyright owners’ ability to exploit their 
works, while preserving the public’s liberties to read, listen, view, or use 
those works, even when individual consumers made unlicensed copies 
for personal use.128 
                                                      
Id. at 153–57; see also 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2012). The Register’s Report therefore recommended 
that Congress either enact a narrow archival privilege for backups that expressly prohibited the 
distribution of backup copies, or amend the first sale doctrine to exclude any fair use copies from its 
coverage. See id. at 157–61. Copyright owner lobbyists have steadfastly resisted proposals to 
implement some analogue of the first sale doctrine for works in digital form. See 2014 First Sale 
Under Title 1 Hearing, supra note 15, at 108–09 (2014) (testimony of Emery Simon, BSA, The 
Software Alliance); id. at 138–50 (statement submitted by the Association of American Publishers). 
Since the Supreme Court ruled in Kirtsaeng v. Wiley, __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 1351 (2013), that 
§ 109(a) applies to copies manufactured outside of the United States as well as to copies 
manufactured within it, publishers have sought to persuade Congress to narrow the doctrine, see 
2014 First Sale Under Title 17 Hearing, supra note 15, at 6 (testimony of Stephen Smith, John 
Wiley & Sons, Inc.), and have urged the U.S. Trade Representative to negotiate trade agreements 
repudiating the Supreme Court decision. See Margot Kaminski, The Capture of International 
Intellectual Property Law Through the U.S. Trade Regime, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 977 (2014).  
126. See 2001 Section 104 Report Hearing, supra note 15, at 183–86 (statement of Douglas 
Lowenstein, Interactive Digital Software Association). 
127. See id. at 80–83 (statement of Marvin Berenson, Broadcast Music, Inc.). 
128. In 2002, the producers of censored versions of popular DVDs filed suit against film studios 
seeking a declaratory judgment that their businesses were not infringing. The studios 
counterclaimed for copyright infringement. Businesses that produced software designed to censor 
objectionable content on DVDs intervened as counterclaimants and counter defendants, seeking a 
declaration that their software, which did not require the distribution of copies of the censored films, 
did not infringe the copyrights in the films. See CleanFlicks of Colorado, LLC, v. Soderbergh, 433 
F. Supp. 2d 1236 (D. Colo. 2006). Representative Lamar Smith introduced a bill to allow families to 
make objectionable content on DVDs imperceptible, so long as no fixed copy was made of the 
altered film. H.R. 4586, 108th Cong. (2004). The Register of Copyrights testified that she believed 
the manufacture and use of such software was completely legal. See The Family Movie Act: 
Hearing on H.R. 4586 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, & Intellectual Prop. of the H. 
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Those background assumptions changed when the widespread 
adoption of peer-to-peer file sharing threatened to displace traditional 
distribution systems. Copyright owners asserted that individual 
consumers using networked digital technology posed a greater threat to 
copyright than commercial pirates.129 Representatives of newfangled 
services insisted that individuals using their services were making lawful 
personal uses of protected content.130 Yet, neither members of Congress 
nor copyright owners sought legislation that would address consumers’ 
unlicensed copying directly, or clarify the circumstances under which 
personal copying would support infringement liability. Peer-to-peer 
systems inspired the recording industry association to bring “John Doe” 
suits against thousands of individual consumers.131 Most of the 30,000 
John Doe suits settled without a trial, but the handful that were tried 
resulted in jaw-dropping verdicts against individual users of peer-to-peer 
file sharing software.132 At recent House Judiciary Committee hearings, 
                                                      
Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 7–8 (2004) [hereinafter 2004 Movie Act Hearing] (testimony 
of MaryBeth Peters, Register of Copyrights). Jack Valenti testified for the Motion Picture 
Association of America that while the studios had no objection to families’ fast forwarding through 
objectionable content in the privacy of their homes, enacting the bill would both undermine the 
copyright owners’ fundamental right to make derivative works and would give cover to companies 
making profits from disfiguring the original vision of the movies’ creators. Id. at 67–68. Valenti 
suggested that Congress should wait and see whether ongoing negotiations between film studios and 
software companies might yield a licensing solution. Id. at 68. At no time was there any suggestion 
that consumers might face lawsuits challenging their use of such software. Representative Smith 
insisted that the legislation was necessary to protect software companies from the financial burden 
of litigation. Id. at 2. Congress enacted the bill the following year as Title II of the Family 
Entertainment and Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 109-9, 119 Stat. 223 (2005) (codified in relevant part 
at 17 U.S.C. § 110(11) (2012)). The House Committee Report characterized the law as a 
clarification of potential liability for companies that assisted parents in seeking to “control what 
their children watch in the privacy of their own home.” H.R. REP. NO. 33, at 5 (2005). Thus, while 
the statutory privilege is cast in terms of consumers’ private use, its impetus and justification was to 
protect commercial businesses from liability for enabling those uses. The privilege does not extend 
to making a fixed copy of the censored film for personal use. Title I of the Family Entertainment 
and Copyright Act criminalized the unlicensed recording of a motion picture in a movie theater, and 
set a penalty of three years imprisonment for a first offense and six years imprisonment for 
subsequent offenses. 
129. See 2002 Piracy Hearing, supra note 112, at 19–23 (statement of Hilary Rosen, Recording 
Industry Association of America); id. at 102 (statement of National Music Publishers’ Association).  
130. See 2000 Music on the Internet Hearing, supra note 112, at 16 (2000) (statement of Hank 
Barry, Napster); id. at 22 (statement of Michael Robertson, MP3.com, Inc.); id. at 39 (statement of 
Gene Kan, Infrasearch, Inc.). 
131. See Arista Records, LLC v. Doe, 604 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2010); Sarah McBride & Ethan 
Smith, Music Industry to Abandon Mass Suits, WALL ST. J., Dec. 19, 2008, at B1–2; Greg Sandoval, 
RIAA’s Cary Sherman Says Lawsuits Were the Only Option, CNETNEWS.COM (Dec. 19, 2008, 4:38 
PM), http://www.cnet.com/news/riaas-cary-sherman-says-lawsuits-were-the-only-option/. 
132. See Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 719 F.3d 67, 72 (1st Cir. 2013) ($675,000); 
Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 692 F.3d 899, 901 (8th Cir. 2012) ($1,920,000 reduced on 
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critics of the verdicts urged Congress to revisit the statutory damages 
provisions to adjust the range of damages to make them more nearly 
proportional to the harm caused by infringement.133 Copyright owners 
resisted any reduction; they insisted that statutory damages perform a 
crucial deterrent function that is only possible when very large awards 
are available.134 
The John Doe suits, though, were a highly publicized sideshow; 
mainstream copyright owners have largely abandoned them today.135 
Copyright owners’ more important goal was to hold providers of Internet 
services liable for consumers’ allegedly infringing activities. In 2005, 
motion picture and music copyright owners succeeded in recovering 
against Grokster, the proprietor of popular peer-to-peer file sharing 
software, for inducing individual consumers to commit copyright 
infringement.136 Copyright owners followed up that victory by filing 
inducement suits against other distributors of peer-to-peer file sharing 
                                                      
appeal to $220,000); BMG Music v. Gonzalez, 430 F.3d 888, 889 (7th Cir. 2005) ($22,500 awarded 
on summary judgment). 
133. See Copyright Remedies: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Prop., & the 
Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 65–67 (2014) [hereinafter Copyright 
Remedies Hearing] (testimony of Sherwin Siy, Public Knowledge); id. at 51–53 (testimony of Matt 
Schruers, Computer and Communications Industry Ass’n); The Scope of Copyright Protection: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Prop., & the Internet of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 113th Cong. 7, 20–21 (2014) (statement of David Nimmer, UCLA School of Law); id. at 
116 (statement of Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Tulane University Law School).  
134. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, DEP’T OF COMMERCE INTERNET POLICY TASK 
FORCE, PUBLIC ROUNDTABLE PANEL DISCUSSION ON GREEN PAPER ON COPYRIGHT POLICY, 
CREATIVITY, AND INNOVATION IN THE DIGITAL ECONOMY 97–98 (June 25, 2014) (statement of Jay 
Rosenthal, National Music Publishers Association), available at http://www.uspto.gov/ip/ 
global/copyrights/GREEN_PAPER_ON_COPYRIGHT_POLICY_etc.PDF; id. at 90–91 (statement 
of David Herlihy, Herlihylaw.com and Northeastern University); U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, 
ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSIONS ON REMIXES, STATUTORY DAMAGES AND DIGITAL FIRST SALE 
DOCTRINE 17 (May 21, 2014) (remarks of Steven Marks, Recording Industry Association of 
America), available at http://www.uspto.gov/ip/global/copyrights/roundtable_transcript-nashville-
14-06-10.pdf. 
135. After five years, the Recording Industry Association of America announced it would end its 
program of suing thousands of individual consumers for copyright infringement. See McBride & 
Smith, supra note 131, at B7. The tactic had by then spread to the owners of copyrights in 
independent films, pornographic films, and the Las Vegas Review Journal. See Copyright Trolls, 
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/issues/copyright-trolls (last visited Jan. 5, 
2015); Eriq Gardner, “Hurt Locker” Producer Nicolas Chartier on His Anti-Piracy Crusade and 
Why Union Workers Need Less Pay, HOLLYWOOD REP. (Jan. 15, 2015), 
http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/hurt-locker-producer-nicolas-chartier-763982.  
136. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005). Rebecca 
Tushnet mused on the implications of the Grokster opinion for the VCR, iPod, and distributors of 
BitTorrent software. See Rebecca Tushnet, REBECCA TUSHNET’S 43(B)LOG (June 27, 2005), 
http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2005/06/this-is-copy-of-what-i-posted-at.html. 
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software,137 Internet service providers,138 websites,139 user-generated 
content sites,140 credit card companies,141 cloud storage businesses,142 a 
satellite television company,143 and venture capital firms,144 with mixed 
results. Courts have struggled to determine whether to attribute allegedly 
actionable copying and other uses to consumers or to defendant 
intermediaries.145 (This is another question the forty-year-old statute 
understandably failed to address.) If the consumer is responsible for the 
allegedly infringing acts, then the intermediaries’ liability turns on 
whether the consumers’ acts should be deemed fair use. 
By replacing a regime of detailed defined rights with one in which 
copyright exclusive rights are defined broadly, subject to many detailed 
express exceptions, Congress in 1976 increased the pressure on fair use 
significantly. The only exceptions enacted as part of the 1976 Act were 
those requested by lobbyists for particular user interests and assented to 
by lobbyists for copyright owners.146 In the nearly forty years since then, 
                                                      
137. See, e.g., Arista Records, LLC v. Lime Group LLC, 784 F. Supp. 2d 398 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
138. See generally Steve Seidenberg, US Perspectives: ISPs in US Face New Copyright Attack, 
INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Dec. 22, 2014), http://www.ip-watch.org/2014/12/22/isps-in-us-face-new-
copyright-attack/. 
139. See, e.g., Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Fung, 710 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2013). 
140. See, e.g., Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2012); Flava Works, Inc. 
v. Gunter, 689 F.3d 754 (7th Cir. 2012). 
141. See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n, 494 F.3d 788 (9th Cir. 2007). 
142. See, e.g., Disney Enters. Inc. v. Hotfile Corp., 798 F. Supp. 2d 1303 (S.D. Fla. 2011); 
Perfect 10, Inc. v. Rapidshare A.G., No. 09-CV-2596, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146053 (S.D. Cal. 
2010); see also Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 
(discussing inducement claims against business that purported to facilitate the resale of digital music 
downloads). 
143. The complaint in Fox Broad. Co. v. Dish Network, L.L.C., 747 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2014), 
alleged that Dish Network induced infringing copying by consumers by supplying digital video 
recorders with commercial skipping capabilities. See Complaint at 17–18, Fox Broad. Co. v. Dish 
Network, L.L.C., 747 F.3d. 1060 (9th Cir. 2014) (No. CV12-04529). The district court and the 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded for the purpose of a preliminary injunction motion 
that consumers’ use of the digital video recorders was fair, and Dish was therefore unlikely to be 
liable for inducement. 747 F.3d at 1068–70; see also Dish Network, L.L.C. v. Am. Broad. Cos., No. 
12-CV-4155, 2013 US Dist LEXIS 143492 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (discussing contributory infringement 
counterclaims filed by ABC and CBS on the same facts). 
144. See, e.g., UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., No. 07-CV-5744, 2009 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 70553, aff’d, 718 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2013). 
145. See Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2512–13 (2014) (Scalia, J. , 
dissenting); Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc. 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008); Perfect 10, 
Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007); Costar Group, Inc. v. Loopnet, Inc., 373 
F.3d 544 (4th Cir. 2004); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’ns Servs., 907 F. Supp. 
1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995). 
146. See Litman, supra note 27. 
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the only express exceptions added to the statute have been those 
proposed by lobbyists for particular user interests and assented to by 
lobbyists for copyright owners.147 Sometimes, even when everyone 
agrees that the law no longer makes sense, copyright owner lobbyists 
resist the enactment of any new exceptions or privileges, allegedly 
because any new exception would vastly increase the risk of commercial 
piracy.148 That requires courts, counsel, administrators, and individuals 
to rely on ill-defined implicit privileges or exceptions, or to believe in a 
generous and forgiving version of the fair use privilege.149 
Congress has had many opportunities in the thirty years since Sony to 
revisit the issues of personal use and contributory infringement. In the 
decade when the Sony test held sway, Congress codified a consumer 
personal copying privilege in the Audio Home Recording Act. In the 
ensuing years, lobbyists for copyright owners have discouraged 
Congress from enacting even narrow privileges for personal copying.150 
In addressing the liability of Internet service providers for infringement 
by subscribers, Congress enacted safe harbors insulating service 
providers from liability for the infringement of third parties, but did not 
take the opportunity to address what measure of damages might be 
appropriate for service providers who exceeded those safe harbors. 
Copyright owner lobbyists have resisted any suggestions to fill that 
gap.151 Thus, the core problems that led the Sony Court to rule the way it 
did remain unaddressed by intervening legislation. 
It’s hard to avoid the inference that copyright owners hope to 
discourage Congress from paying too much attention to the question of 
                                                      
147. See Litman, supra note 66. 
148. See, e.g., 2001 Section 104 Report Hearing, supra note 15; see also supra notes 120–27 and 
accompanying text. 
149. It’s also worth reflecting that some of the recent copyright fair use decisions that have 
attracted the most heated complaints would have been slam-dunk fair use cases under the standard 
articulated in Sony. One rights holder representative compared the district court decision in Authors 
Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 902 F. Supp. 2d 445 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), aff’d, 755 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2014), 
for example, to Plessy v. Ferguson, 63 U.S. 537 (1896), which notoriously upheld the 
constitutionality of state segregation laws under the doctrine of “separate but equal.” See LIBRARY 
OF CONG., ORPHAN WORKS AND MASS DIGITIZATION ROUNDTABLES 118 (2014) (statement of 
Mickey Osterreicher, National Press Photographers’ Association), available at 
http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/transcript/0311LOC.pdf. Yet, as an unambiguously 
noncommercial use, HathiTrust’s activities would have been entitled to Sony’s presumption of 
fairness. 
150. See sources cited supra notes 117, 125, and 126. 
151. See Copyright Remedies Hearing, supra note 133, at 75–76 (testimony of Nancy E. Wolff, 
Cowan DeBaets Abrahams & Sheppard); id. at 116–24 (statement of Sandra Aistars, Copyright 
Alliance). 
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consumer liability for personal uses. All evidence suggests that members 
of Congress believe that at least some and perhaps most personal uses 
are non-infringing, and might enact an exemption into law if they were 
pressed. The absence of a statutory provision leaves personal uses to the 
fickle embrace of § 107. But representatives of public interest groups, 
consumer groups, libraries, and educational institutions have gradually 
come to agree that they prefer the current law to an explicit statutory 
privilege.152 Fair use subjects them to significant uncertainty but 
probably gives them broader leeway to make appropriate uses than any 
amendment that copyright owner lobbyists would permit Congress to 
enact. 
The story surrounding secondary liability of Internet-related trumpet 
makers is somewhat different. Copyright owners have actively sought, 
but so far failed to secure, the enactment of statutes enabling them to 
shut down services that allegedly facilitate infringement.153 One 
important factor in the failure of the legislation has been copyright 
owner lobbyists’ refusal to compromise on the terms of the law with the 
businesses they were seeking to put out of business.154 Another was that 
the overreaching provisions that copyright owners sought were 
sufficiently extreme to inspire a rare, widespread public protest.155 
Without a statutory fix, copyright owners have sued Internet 
intermediaries directly, but are finding the statutory safe harbor and 
consumers’ plausible fair use privilege to be significant obstacles.156 
In the nearly forty years since Congress enacted the 1976 Copyright 
Act, the rights of copyright owners have expanded markedly. Copyright 
                                                      
152. See The Scope of Fair Use Hearing, supra note 5, at 6–7 (testimony of Peter Jaszi, American 
University); id. at 22–24 (statement of Naomi Novik, Organization for Transformative Works); id. 
at 144–54 (statement of the Library Copyright Alliance). 
153. See Stop Online Piracy Act, H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. (2011); Protect IP Act of 2011, S. 968, 
112th Cong. (2011); see generally AnneMarie Bridy, Copyright Policymaking as Procedural 
Democratic Process: A Discourse-Theoretic Perspective of ACTA, SOPA and PIPA, 30 CARDOZO 
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 153 (2012). 
154. See, e.g., Zoe Lofgren, Championing Technology and FreeSpeech in Congress Was 
Lonely . . . But Not Anymore, in HACKING POLITICS: HOW GEEKS, PROGRESSIVES, THE TEA PARTY, 
GAMERS, ANARCHISTS, AND SUITS TEAMED UP TO DEFEAT SOPA AND SAVE THE INTERNET 181, 
181–88 (David Moon, Patrick Ruffini & David Segal, eds. 2013) [hereinafter HACKING POLITICS]; 
Patrick Ruffini, A Punch in the Gut, in HACKING POLITICS, supra, at 107–12. 
155. See Tiffany Cheng, The Blackout, in HACKING POLITICS, supra note 154, at 158, 158–60. 
156. See, e.g., UMG Recordings v. Veoh, 718 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2013); Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. 
YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2012); see also Fox Broad. Co. v. Dish Network L.L.C., No. 
12-CV-4529, 2015 WL 1137593 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2015) (granting summary judgment to Dish 
Network on claim that it induces infringing consumer copying of Fox programming because 
consumers’ copying is fair use). 
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owners’ demands for further expansion continue unabated. Meanwhile, 
they raise strident objections to all proposals to add new privileges and 
exceptions to the statute to shelter non-infringing uses that might be 
implicated by their expanded rights. Copyright owners have used the 
resulting uncertainty over the scope of liability for new uses to litigate 
some new businesses into bankruptcy before their legality could be 
determined.157 All of these developments push fair use to shelter new 
uses and users. When copyright owners complain that fair use has 
stretched beyond their expectations, they fail to acknowledge their own 
responsibility for its growth. 
CONCLUSION 
When Congress enacted the 1976 Act, it apparently believed that 
consumers’ personal copying would not subject them to liability for 
copyright infringement under the new statute, but nothing in the 
language of the statute made that understanding explicit. Congress did 
not consider and did not provide for claims that making devices that 
facilitate consumer infringement might subject device makers to 
infringement liability. The Sony case, filed shortly after the Act’s 
enactment, raised both questions. Confronted with a choice between 
finding liability where Congress had not intended to impose it or 
construing the statute to reach a narrower set of uses than the literal 
language might warrant, the Supreme Court settled on a new formulation 
of the fair use privilege that allowed it to avoid finding Sony liable for 
consumers’ personal copying. That fair use analysis wreaked a lot of 
mischief in the decade it controlled, chiefly by making it much more 
difficult for commercial uses to claim their uses were fair. It also, for 
good or ill, encouraged both consumers and businesses to structure their 
interactions around the assumption that consumers’ personal copying 
would normally be fair use. In 1994, the Court decided Campbell, and 
replaced the analysis it had adopted in Sony with a test that focused 
primarily on the transformativeness of the allegedly fair use. It left the 
implications of that change for secondary liability and consumer 
personal uses uncharted. 
Meanwhile, Congress had enacted the Audio Home Recording Act, 
articulating an exemption from liability for consumers’ noncommercial 
copying of recorded music,158 but had not otherwise addressed the 
                                                      
157. See generally Litman, supra note 103; Jessica Litman, Antibiotic Resistance, 30 CARDOZO 
ARTS & ENT. L. J. 53 (2012). 
158. See supra notes 97–103 and accompanying text. 
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question of consumer liability for personal use. It had doubled the 
statutory damages available for infringement,159 but had not tackled the 
appropriate monetary relief for trumpet makers held contributorily liable 
for the aggregate infringement of millions of consumers. After 
Campbell, copyright owner lobbyists discouraged Congress from adding 
any further express exceptions, privileges, or limitations to the statute, 
and from reducing or moderating the statutory damages range. When 
consumer advocates or the Copyright Office pointed out inconsistencies 
between the literal words of the statute and common, non-infringing 
consumer behavior, copyright owners insisted that the proponents of 
new limitations had failed to make a compelling showing that the status 
quo caused actual harm. If consumers were not being sued for their 
activity, the fact that their behavior might be prohibited by a literal 
reading of the language of the law, they insisted, harmed nobody. 
Congress has a longstanding disinclination to enact copyright laws over 
the opposition of major copyright lobbies,160 and has not been motivated 
to disregard that opposition in order to clarify either the scope of 
consumer liability for personal copying or the contours of contributory 
infringement. 
Copyright rights have expanded and will probably continue to 
expand. Advocates for copyright owners resist any proposal to 
incorporate specific privileges and exceptions into the statute to 
privilege uses that Congress deems non-infringing. They warn that any 
new privilege or exception poses a grave risk that future pirates will 
make use of the privileges to shield wrongful behavior. The uncertainty 
surrounding consumer liability, moreover, is itself a weapon that can be 
deployed against newfangled trumpet makers and the venture capital 
firms that might fund them. With no specific exceptions, though, courts 
have little recourse but to construe fair use as expansively as they have 
recently construed copyright rights. And that is very expansively indeed. 
 
                                                      
159. See Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853, 
2860. In 1999, the Digital Theft Deterrence and Copyright Damages Improvement Act increased 
statutory damages yet again. Digital Theft Deterrence and Copyright Damages Improvement Act of 
1999, Pub. L. No. 106-160, 113 Stat. 1774. 
160. See generally Litman, supra note 27. 
